In this paper we study the bilevel dynamic optimiza- 
Introduction
Let us consider a two-level hierarchical system where the higher level (hereafter the "leader") and the lower level (hereafter the "follower") must find vectors z E 2 and control functions U ( . ) , respectively, to minimize their individual objective functions J l ( z , .
) and
Jz(z,u).
The leader is assumed to select his decision vector z E 2 first and the follower to select his decision control function .(.) E U after that, where 2 is a nonempty subset of R" and and U is the set of admissible controls. Under these assumptions on the order of play, the game will proceed as follows: Given any decision vector z E Z chosen by the leader, the follower will select his decision control function U , ( . ) E U (depending on the decision vector z chosen by the leader) to minimize his objective J2(z,uz). Assume that the game is cooperative, i.e., if the follower's problem has several optimal controls for a given parameter z , then the follower allows the leader to choose which of them is actually used. Thus the leader chooses his optimal decision vector z E 2 to minimize the leader's objective Jl(z, U,). In other words, given any decision vector z E 2 chosen by the leader, the follower faces the ordinary (single level) optimal control problem involving a parameter z:
while the leader faces the bilevel dynamic optimization problem:
over z E 2 and all optimal pairs ( x z , u z )
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The bilevel dynamic optimization problem has many applications in economics and management science. For instance, the leader may be the government that sets up the taxaction policy z and the follower may be a company that seeks the optimal policy uZ(t) in reaction to the government's taxation policy. In
Clarke and Munro [6, 71, a fishery regulation problem was formulated and solved as an infinite horizon version of the bilevel dynamic optimization problem. The bilevel static problem where both leader and follower's decisions are vectors instead of control functions was first introduced by von Stackelberg [9] for an economic model (therefore it is sometimes referred to as Stackelberg game) . The bilevel dynamic problem where both leader and follower's decisions are control functions were first considered by Chen and Cruz in [2] . Most of the bilevel (static or dynamic) problems are attacked by reducing the lower level problem through first order necessary conditions (cf. Bard and Falk [l] and Zhang 114, 151 for the bilevel static problem and Zhang [14] for the bilevel dynamic problem).
However this reduction is equivalent if and only if the lower level problem is convex since in this case the first order necessary condition is also sufficient.
Apart from the strong convexity assumption, the resulting optimality conditions of the above approach involve second order (generalized in nonsmooth case The purpose of this paper is to provide first order necessary conditions for problem PI under very general assumptions (in particular, without convexity assumptions on the lower level problem).
Define the value function of the lower level optimal control problem as an extended-valued function V :
a.e. The above problem is obviously equivalent to the original bilevel dynamic optimiztion problem PI and is a standard optimal control problem except that the endpoint constraints involve the value function V of the lower level optimal control problem. In general V is not an explicit function of the problem data and is nonsmooth even in the case where all problem data are smooth functions. h c e n t developments in nonsmooth anslysis allow us to study the generalized derivatives of the value function V and relate them to the multiplier sets for the lower level optimal control problem, hence derive a necessary condition for optimality. This approach was first used by Ye and Zhu [13] to derive first order necessary conditions for the static bilevel opt.imization problem. Necessary optimality conditions for t,he bilevel dynamic problem where the decision variable of both levels are control functions were derived in Ye [ 111 and Ye and Zhu [ 121 using a similar approach.
V ( z )
The following basic assumptions are in force throughout this paper: In $2, we study generalized differentiability of the value function V ( z ) . The necessary condition for optimality is given in 53.
Generalized differentiability of the value function
We first recall some definitions on nonsmooth analysis that will appear in our theorems.
Let C be a nonempty closed set in R". A vector 
a$(x) = CO@(X).
For the definition and the precise relation between the limiting subgradient and the Clarke generalized gra- The collection of all such arcs is the set MA(.), the index X multiplier set corresponding to 2. Let Y be the set of all optimal trajectory z to problem Pz(z). (1) r>O Using Lemma 3.1 and the nonsmooth maximum principle one obtain the following necessary optimalit,y condition for (PI) (equivalently for problem PI) through some caculation. 
Let

M A ( Y ) := UZEYMX(2).
For any index
IIh(t)II I k(t)IIPZ(t)ll.
By Gronwall's Lemma, the above inequality implies that p2 is either identically 0 or nonvanishingon [to, t l ] .
Therefore (3) implies that pz = 0. Hence q(t) = 0 by virtue of (2). But q satisfies (4), therefore q G 0.
That is Q@(Y) = (0).
Another sufficient condition for @ ( Y ) = (0) to hold is that +(t, x, z , U) be independent of z since in this case q(t) E 0. 
